38,649 research outputs found
Financial contracts and strategic customer exclusion
The paper studies an incentive contract in a monopolistic and duopolistic credit
market where borrowers are different in risk. One lender is in an advantaged position
with respect to the other due to past relations with the borrowers. The
features of the equilibrium contract are investigated. It is shown that the equilibrium
contract drastically changes between the monopolistic and the duopolistic
situations and are sensitive to other parameters. In some cases, the superior lender
strategically yields borrowers, especially the better ones to the opponent lender
Non-price competition in credit card markets through bundling and bank level benefits
The attempts to explain the high and sticky credit card rates have given rise to a vast literature on credit card markets. This paper endeavors to explain the rates in the Turkish market using measures of non-price competition. In this market, issuers compete monopolistically by differentiating their credit card products. The fact that credit cards and all other banking services are perceived as a bundle by consumers allows banks to deploy also bank level characteristics to differentiate their credit cards. Thus, credit card rates are expected to be affected by the features and service quality of banks. Panel data estimations also control for various costs associated with credit card lending. The results show significant and robust effects of the non-price competition variables on credit card rates.Credit Cards, Monopolistic Competition, Product Differentiation, Bundling, Bank Pricing Behavior, Regulation
International factor mobility, informal interest rate and capital market imperfection: a general equilibrium analysis
This paper makes a pioneering attempt to provide a theory of determination of interest rate in the informal credit market in a small open economy in terms of a three-sector general equilibrium model. There are two informal sectors which obtain production loans from a monopolistic moneylender and employ labour from the informal labour market. On the other hand, the formal sector employs labour at an institutionally fixed wage rate and takes loans from the competitive formal credit market. We show that an inflow of foreign capital and/or an emigration of labour raises (lowers) the informal (formal) interest rate while lowers the competitive wage rate in the informal labour market when the informal manufacturing sector is more capital-intensive vis-Ă -vis the agricultural informal sector. International factor mobility, therefore, increases the degrees of distortions in both the factor markets in this case.Informal credit, formal credit, moneylender, foreign capital, emigration, general equilibrium
Is bonded labor voluntary? A framework against forced work
UN estimate that 20 million are held in bonded labor. Several economic analyses assert that bonded laborers accept these contracts voluntarily, which could imply that a ban would make such laborers worse off. We question the voluntariness of bonded labor, and present a mechanism that keeps workers trapped. With different types of landlords not revealed to the laborer, we show how some landlords manipulate contract terms so that the laborer becomes bonded. Enforcement mechanisms and the monopolistic market for credit thus play a joint role. Providing alternative sources of credit, offer proper conflict resolution institutions over labor-contract disputes and banning could emancipate bonded labor, which would make them better off.Coercion Debt slavery Power Bonded labor Nepal Asia
Information sharing in credit markets: incentives for incorrect information reporting
The introduction of institutions of credit information sharing - private credit bureaus and public credit registries - in the market for bank loans represent one of the possible solutions of information asymmetry problem, - the problem which the creditors tend to face. However the possibility of information sharing influences the bank's incentives in two different ways. While it disciplines the borrowers and, therefore, reduces the share of bad loans, a bank loses the competitive advantage, namely the monopolistic knowledge about the data in its clients' credit histories. Does the bank have an opportunity at its disposal to use the benefits of information sharing without losing its competitive advantage and its clientele? One way to do so is to report false data on borrowers. This paper analyses the bank's incentives for such opportunistic behavior and describes the impact of false information reporting on the characteristics of market equilibrium. The opportunity to get extra profit and to offer less expensive credit to new clients explains why banks prefer the strategy of dishonest behavior. This paper outlines the role of the informational intermediary in quality control for the data, contained in credit reports. Also, it describes the conditions under which verification of a certain share of reports provides that the parameters characterizing the equilibrium are equal to those in no information asymmetry situation.
Take the money and run: making profits by paying borrowers to stay home
Can a bank increase its profit by subsidizing inactivity? This paper suggests this may occur, due to the presence of hidden information, in a monopolistic credit market. Rather than offering credit in a pooling contract, a monopolist bank can sort borrowers through an appropriate subsidy to inactivity. Under some conditions, sorting may avoid the collapse of the market and increases the welfare of everybody. The bank increases its profits, good borrowers benefit from lower interest rates and bad potential borrowers from the subsidy. The subsidy policy however implies a cross subsidy between contracts and this is possible only under monopoly
The Inclusiveness of Exclusion
We extend Armstrongâs (1996) result on exclusion in multi-dimensional screening models in two key ways, providing support for the view that this result is quite generic and applicable to many different markets. First, we relax the strong technical assumptions he imposed on preferences and consumer types. Second, we extend the result beyond the monopolistic market structure to generalized oligopoly settings with entry. We also analyse applications to several quite different settings: credit markets, automobile industry, research grants, the regulation of a monopolist with unknown demand and cost functions, and involuntary unemployment in the labor market.Multidimensional screening; exclusion; regulation of amonopoly; involuntary unemployment
Bank Competition - When is it Good?
The effects of bank competition and institutions on credit markets are usually studied separately although both factors are interdependent. We study the effect of bank competition on the choice of contracts (screening versus collateralized credit contract) and explicitly capture the impact of the institutional environment. Most importantly, we show that the effects of bank competition on collateralization, access to finance, and social welfare depend on the institutional environment. We predict that firms' access to credit increases in bank competition if institutions are weak but bank competition does not matter if they are well-developed
Strategic group lending for banks
Credit institutions often refuse to lend money to small firms. Usually, this happens
because small firms are not able to provide collateral to lenders. Moreover, given the
small amount of required loans, the relative cost of full monitoring is too high for
lenders. Group lending contracts have been viewed as an effective solution to credit
rationing of small firms in both developing and industrialized countries. The aim of
this paper is to highlight the potential of group lending contracts in terms of credit
risk management. In particular, this paper provides a theoretical explanation of the
potential of group lending programs in screening good borrowers from bad ones to
reduce the incidence of non-performing-loans (NPL). This paper shows that the success
of firms involved in selected group lending programs is due to the fact that cosignature
is an effective screening device: more precisely, if lenders make a proper use
of co-signature to screen good firms from bad ones, then only firms that are good
ex-ante enter group lending contracts. So, the main argument of this paper is that
well designed group lending programs induce good firms to become jointly liable,
at least partially, with other good firms and discourage other â bad-firms to do the
same. Specifically, co-signature is proven to be a screening device only in the case of a
perfectly competitive bank sector
Bank structure, capital accumulation and growth: a simple macroeconomic model
This paper analyzes the equilibrium growth paths of two economies that are identical in all respects, except for the organization of their financial systems: in particular, one has a competitive banking system and the other has a monopolistic banking system. In addition, the sources of inefficiencies, as a result of monopoly banking, and their relationship to the existence of credit rationing are explored. Monopoly in banking tends to depress the equilibrium law of motion for the capital stock for either of two reasons. When credit rationing exists, monopoly banks ration credit more heavily than competitive banks. When credit is not rationed, the existence of monopoly banking leads to excessive monitoring of credit financed investment. Both of these have adverse consequences for capital accumulation. In addition, monopoly banking is more likely to lead to credit rationing than is competitive banking. Finally, the scope for development trap phenomena to arise is considered under both a competitive and a monopolistic banking system.Monopolies ; Banking structure
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